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A healthy and robust network of wetlands protects coastal 
communities from storm damage caused by hurricanes. 
Unfortunately, development pressures threaten wetlands along 
the South Atlantic coast, the region most susceptible to an 
increased risk of climate change induced hurricanes. If these 
wetlands are not protected from destruction, coastal communities 
will be left without a buffer against flooding, storm damage, and 
sea level rise. In addition to putting the public at large in 
physical danger, significant environmental justice concerns 
accompany the failure to protect coastal wetlands. In order to 
protect these ever-diminishing resources, federal and state law 
makers have enacted regulatory regimes that combat wetland 
degradation. However, these regimes are severely flawed, as 
they: (1) are difficult for private property owners to navigate; (2) 
lack inter-governmental coordination; and (3) give rise to litigable 
conflicts between private property owners and state and federal 
regulators. The 2013 Supreme Court decision Koontz v. St. John’s 
River Water Mgmt. Dist., which extends the essential nexus and 
rough proportionality requirements of Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard to monetary 
exactions, threatens to further undermine the efficacy of these 
regulatory regimes by inducing a regulatory chilling effect, Thus, 
this note argues that courts should extend the application of the 
public necessity defense to regulatory takings cases, thereby 
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absolving the government of takings liability, where the state can 
show that the destruction of coastal wetlands will expose 
vulnerable communities to harm from hurricanes and sea level 
rise. 
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A big wave came like a tsunami and broke through 
the back wall. The house started filling with water, 
pushing shut the front door . . . . I tried to open the 
door, but now the water was up to my waist and 
rising. I went to the side of the house to try to pry 
off the wood from the windows, but a wave knocked 
me down. The water was now over my head. I was 
treading water . . . . It was completely dark and the 
water was raging around me. I swam out into the 
middle of my road, trying to get to higher ground, 
but the current and the waves took me in another 
direction. All kinds of debris were hitting me in the 
face and I could see refrigerators float by, as well as 
boats and stoves. I later found out my lip was split 





open practically up to my nose and I had a black 
eye, but right then, I was numb and just trying to 
stay alive.1 
 
This excerpt from Kim Joyce’s harrowing survival story 
demonstrates the disturbing reality that Superstorm Sandy 
imposed on countless individuals on October 29, 2012.2 The 
hurricane turned “Superstorm” killed 132 people, destroyed 
nearly 380,000 housing units, and caused $80 billion in 
damages.3 
Seven years earlier, another shocking storm made landfall 
in the United States.4 Hurricane Katrina, the devastating 
Category-3 hurricane that hit New Orleans on August 29, 2005, 
brought with it a twenty-four to twenty-eight-foot tidal surge that 
tumbled houses and shattered lives.5 “Coming in last night, it 
was like going through a war zone,” said Chris Moore, a native of 
New Orleans’ Seventh Ward and a Hurricane Katrina survivor.6 
Moore explained, “The streets are blocked off, there’s a lot of 
damage to buildings. Nothing but darkness in the depth of the 
                                               
1. Jennifer Wolff, I Survived Hurricane Sandy, WOMEN’S HEALTH, 
June 18, 2013, http://www.womenshealthmag.com/life/hurricane-sandy-survivor 
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
2. See id. (relaying Kim Joyce’s survival story). 
3. See Andy Newman, Hurricane Sandy vs. Hurricane Katrina, 
CITY ROOM (Nov. 27, 2012, 4:17 PM), 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/hurricane-sandy-vs-hurricane-
katrina/ (comparing damage statistics for Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
4. See Adrianne Appel, Still Struggling, Katrina's Victims Tell 
Stories of Survival, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 1, Sept. 27, 2005, 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/09/0927_050927_katrina_victims
.html (reporting the effects of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans residents) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
5. See RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: 
HURRICANE KATRINA, NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER 8–9 (Dec. 20, 2005), 
available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf 
(describing the intensity of Hurricane Katrina) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
6. See Appel, supra note 4, at 2 (describing the general 
devastation left by Hurricane Katrina). 
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city where there should be lights.”7 The costliest hurricane in 
American history, Hurricane Katrina killed over 1,800 people, 
damaged 1.2 million homes, displaced over 1 million people, and 
caused $148 billion in damage.8 Days after the storm, Jeffrey 
Treadway of Myrtle Grove, a rural town twenty-miles southeast 
of Baton Rouge, explained, “[t]here’s nothing left . . . no one has a 
home.”9  
 Unfortunately, recent research suggests that these 
extreme weather events will become more frequent and severe as 
climate change affects global weather patterns.10 Scientists 
anticipate that the South Atlantic Coast (North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, and Florida) will be one of the most harshly 
affected regions.11 In an effort to identify how states can protect 
their citizens from impending storm damage, this Note describes 
the utility of wetlands, which protect inland communities against 
storm surge and flooding caused by hurricanes.12 
Part II of this Note describes the current status of the 
South Atlantic wetlands and the problems associated with 
wetland loss.13 Despite widespread recognition of the protective 
function of wetlands, coastal wetland destruction occurs at an 
alarming rate along the South Atlantic Coast.14 Residential and 
commercial developments contribute significantly to this 
destruction.15 These developments are becoming more widespread 
                                               
7. Id. 
8. See Newman supra note 3 (outlining the impact of Hurricane 
Katrina). 
9. See Appel, supra note 4, at 1 (depicting the effects of Hurricane 
Katrina’s tidal surge). 
10. See Hurricanes and Wetlands, NAT’L WILDLIFE FOUND., 
http://www.nwf.org/Wildlife/Threats-to-Wildlife/Global-Warming/Global-
Warming-is-Causing-Extreme-Weather/Hurricanes/Hurricanes-and-
Wetlands.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2014) (explaining that coastal communities 
may face more intense storms as oceans continue to warm and to rise in decades 
ahead) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT).  
11. See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra Part II (detailing the functions of wetlands). 
13. See infra Part II (describing the south Atlantic wetlands and 
coastal erosion). 
14. See infra Part II (explaining the wetland losses in each south 
Atlantic state). 
15. See infra Part II (defining the causes of wetland erosion). 





as people flock to coastal communities.16 Therefore, the region 
must address both an increase in population size and a decrease 
in its coastal defense mechanism.17 
Part III of this Note shifts focus to the environmental 
justice implications of this wetland destruction.18 In reviewing 
the aftermaths of Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, Part III 
illustrates that the most vulnerable communities in our society 
suffer the most significant impacts of coastal storms.19 Because 
the citizens of these communities lack bureaucratic 
representation, they rely upon the government for protection 
against environmental harms.20 By preserving wetlands that 
reduce inland storm damage the government can ensure that the 
most marginalized citizens in our society are protected from the 
dangers of coastal storms.21 
Parts IV and V of this Note review the current regulatory 
regimes for wetland protection.22 Part IV examines the Clean 
Water Act, the principal federal legislation addressing wetland 
development.23 Part V examines the state regulatory programs 
that supplement the Clean Water Act.24 The complex procedures 
established under these regulatory regimes for development 
permitting highlight the direct conflict between private property 
rights and public welfare.25  
Part VI addresses the conflict between private property 
rights and public welfare by reviewing the development 
permitting cases that have given rise to regulatory takings claims 
                                               
16. See infra Part II (depicting the influx in coastal residences 
along the South Atlantic Coast). 
17. See infra Part II (describing the impact of increases in 
population along the South Atlantic Coast).  
18. See infra Part III (explaining the environmental justice 
movement). 
19. See infra Part III (detailing the unique ways in which poor, 
minority communities are affected by coastal storm damage).  
20. See infra Part III (describing the lack of bureaucratic 
knowledge among poor, minority communities). 
21. See infra Part II (explaining that poor, minority communities 
are dependent upon governmental assistance for the protection of their rights). 
22. See infra Parts IV–V (outlining the federal and state 
regulatory programs). 
23. See infra Part IV (describing the federal regulatory regime). 
24. See infra Part V (describing state regulatory programs). 
25. See infra notes 113–124 and accompanying text.  
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under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.26 Recently, in 
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist.,27 the U.S. Supreme 
Court extended the essential nexus and rough proportionality 
requirements established in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission28 and Dolan v. City of Tigard29 to monetary 
exactions.30 This development in regulatory takings law may 
have a significant regulatory chilling effect on governments wary 
of civil liability.31 
In order to combat this regulatory chilling effect, which 
threatens to undermine the current wetlands protection regime, 
courts should expand the public necessity defense to absolve the 
state of liability in situations where it can show that destruction 
of coastal wetlands will expose vulnerable communities to harm 
from hurricanes and sea level rise.32 Although the doctrine of 
public necessity is typically conceived of as a tort defense, the 
Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council33 endorsed the 
use of the doctrine as a defense to constitutional takings claims.34 
Part VI of this note outlines the traditional application of the 
public necessity defense and explores the utility of the defense in 
the context of wetlands regulations.35 
 
                                               
26. See infra Part VI (reviewing regulatory takings law).  
27. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
28.  483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
29. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
30. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599 (“[W]e . . . hold that monetary 
exactions must satisfy the nexus and rough proportionality of Nollan and 
Dolan.”). 
31. See Anthony S. Guardino, U.S. Supreme Court Divides Sharply 
in Koontz Ruling, N.Y. L.J. (July 24, 2013), available at 
http://www.farrellfritz.com/wp-content/uploads/article-620.pdf (describing the 
potential for litigation against local municipalities when they impose conditions 
on their willingness to grant or approve permits relinquishing property) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
32. See infra Part VII (arguing for the expansion of the public 
necessity defense). 
33. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
34. See id. at 1028–29 (outlining the parameters of utilizing a 
public necessity defense to a constitutional taking). 
35. See infra Part VII (arguing for the expansion of the Public 
necessity defense). 





II. Overview of the South Atlantic Wetlands 
 
Historically, many viewed wetlands36 as more of a 
nuisance than a public benefit.37 Today scholars recognize that 
wetlands play a crucial role in maintaining healthy coastal 
ecosystems.38 The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
explained that the South Atlantic Region’s coastal wetlands39 
hold particular ecological significance, because the region “has 
the highest wetland density of the entire East Coast and hosts a 
variety of coastal wetlands not found in other parts of the United 
States.”40 North Carolina’s Albemarle-Pamlico sound, the second 
largest lagoonal estuary in the United States, critically supports 
                                               
36. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2014) and 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (2014) 
(defining wetlands as “those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or 
ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under 
normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted 
for life in saturated soil conditions”). 
37. See Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 636 (1900) (“If there 
is any fact which may be supposed to be known by everybody, and therefore by 
courts, it is that swamps and stagnant waters are the cause of malarial and 
malignant fevers, and that the police power is never more legitimately exercised 
than in removing such nuisances.”); JON KUSLER, OUR NATIONAL WETLAND 
HERITAGE 1 (1983) (explaining that wetlands were long thought of as 
“wastelands, sources of mosquitos and impediments to development and 
travel”). 
38. See SUSAN-MARIE STEDMAN & THOMAS E. DAHL, NAT’L OCEANIC 
AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN THE 
COASTAL WATERSHEDS OF THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 1998 TO 2004 7 (2008), 
[hereinafter STATUS AND TRENDS], available at 
http://www.fws.gov/wetlands/Documents/Status-and-Trends-of-Wetlands-in-the-
Coastal-Watersheds-of-the-Eastern-United-States-1998-to-2004.pdf (describing 
the functions and importance of coastal wetlands) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
39. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, COASTAL WETLANDS INITIATIVE: 
SOUTH ATLANTIC REVIEW 2 (2013), [hereinafter SOUTH ATLANTIC REVIEW], 
available at http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/upload/south-atlantic-
review.pdf. (defining coastal wetlands as “saltwater and freshwater wetlands 
within HUC-8 watersheds that drain to the Atlantic, Pacific or Gulf of Mexico”) 
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT).  
40. See id. at 5 (listing the types of wetlands unique to the region, 
including pocosins, cypress swamps, and mangrove forests). 
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North Carolina’s fishing industry.41 South Carolina’s wetlands 
provide habitats for many commercially important species.42 
Even Georgia, the state with the shortest coastline in the region, 
contains one-third of the Atlantic Coast’s remaining coastal 
marshland.43 Florida contains over 11 million acres of wetlands.44 
These wetlands play a significant role in the culture, economy, 
and physical well-being of these states.45 
Coastal wetlands serve several critical functions.46 They 
maintain water quality by filtering, storing, and detoxifying 
waste runoff.47 They serve as spawning grounds, nurseries, and 
shelter for marine life.48 They also provide direct value to humans 
by decreasing inland erosion, stabilizing shorelines, creating vast 
tourism industries, and supporting commercial and recreational 
fishing industries.49 Because of these vital functions, the 
economic value of coastal habitats has been estimated to be in the 
hundreds of billions of dollars.50 
Recently, evidence of coastal erosion has highlighted the 
interplay between wetlands protection and climate change.51 
Importantly, wetlands serve as buffers that protect coastal areas 
                                               
41. See id. (explaining that over ninety percent of the commercial 
fisheries landings in North Carolina depend on the Albemarle-Pamilco sound). 
42. See id. (describing the unique features of South Carolina’s 
wetlands as a breeding ground for commercially important species such as 
shrimp and blue crab). 
43. See id. (reporting the unique features of Georgia’s wetlands 
which are home to over one third of the Atlantic coast’s remaining coastal marsh 
lands). 
44. See id. (detailing the unique features of Florida’s wetlands). 
45. See id. at 1 (explaining the significant and diverse impacts 
that wetlands have on communities). 
46. See SOUTH ATLANTIC REVIEW, supra note 39, at 1 (emphasizing 
the importance of coastal wetlands). 
47. See id. (describing one of the important functions of wetlands 
48. See id. (clarifying how wetlands maintain a healthy coastal 
ecosystem). 
49.  See id. (“[C]oastal wetlands provide direct value to people in 
other ways, such as minimizing erosion of upland, protecting infrastructure and 
supporting the tourism, hunting, and fishing sectors of the economy.”). 
50. See STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 38, at 7 (estimating the 
economic value of coastal habitats). 
51.  See SOUTH ATLANTIC REVIEW, supra note 39, at 12 (“Some of 
the issues likely to be exacerbated by climate change and sea level rise include 
erosion, salt water intrusion, changes in salinity regimes, and changes in 
species composition and distribution.”). 





from flooding, storm damage, and sea level rise.52 These functions 
were put to the test numerous times during the past decade, as 
several hurricanes ravaged communities along the South Atlantic 
Coast, including: Isabel (2003), Frances (2004), Jeanne (2004), 
Irene (2011), and Sandy (2012).53  
Alarmingly, climate change will increase the occurrence of 
these phenomena and will aggravate hurricane frequency and 
intensity.54 A recent study identified at least a forty-five percent 
increase in category 3–5 hurricanes along the South Atlantic 
Coast, an increase higher than any other region in the United 
States.55 Additionally, the U.S. Geological Survey predicts that 
“[t]he beaches, coastal infrastructure, and habitat of the 
southeast Atlantic coast are vulnerable to extreme coastal 
changes during the landfall of even category 1 hurricanes.”56  
The South Atlantic wetlands have long been under threat 
and despite the well-recognized importance of protecting them 
from destruction, they continue to suffer severe losses.57 
                                               
52. See id. at 1 (explaining how wetlands protect against coastal 
storms). 
53. HILARY F. STOCKDON ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGIC SURVEY, NATIONAL 
ASSESSMENT OF HURRICANE-INDUCED COASTAL EROSION HAZARDS: SOUTHEAST 
ATLANTIC COAST 4 (2013), available at 
http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1130/pdf/ofr2013-1130.pdf (calling for a study to 
identify the areas of coastline subject to extreme erosion, and the vulnerability 
of structures built in these areas) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
54. See STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 38, at 12 (“One potential 
result of more frequent and intense storms is worsening of sand overwash after 
hurricanes, which leads to smothering of mangrove wetlands. Storms also put 
low-salinity wetlands at risk, causing salt burn from salt water intrusion, and 
eroding organic marsh substrates.”). 
55. See RISK MGMT. SOLUTIONS, THE 2006 RMS EXPERT ELICITATION 
AND ATLANTIC ACTIVITY HURRICANE RATES UPDATE 5 (2006), available at 
https://support.rms.com/publications/60HUActivityRates_whitepaper.pdf 
(illustrating projected regional increases in hurricane landfall relative to the 
1900-2005 long-term historical baseline) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
56. STOCKDON ET AL., supra note 53, at 24 (describing that a direct 
landfall category 1 hurricane would subject eighty-nine percent of the dune-
backed beaches on the South East Atlantic Coast to erosion). 
57. See SOUTH ATLANTIC REVIEW, supra note 39, at 6 (explaining 
that significant wetland loss has been documented in Florida and South 
Carolina since the 1980s, with an average of 5,000 acres and 3,000 acres lost per 
year, respectively). 
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Historically, forestry, agriculture, and hydrologic modifications 
(such as damming) caused most wetland losses along the South 
Atlantic Coast.58 Today, residential and commercial development 
pressures destroy, erode, and degrade coastal wetland acreage to 
a greater degree.59 Between 1996 and 2006, urban and rural 
development caused forty-percent of all wetland loss in the 
region.60 From 1995 to 2000, Georgia, Florida, and South 
Carolina experienced the highest levels of in-migration in the 
United States with coastal population density increasing by 
seventy-percent between 1980 and 2003.61 Thus, the region most 
susceptible to extreme weather events caused by climate change 
is witnessing severe destruction of its defense mechanism, while 
more people move into these higher risk areas.62 Therefore, 
preserving coastal wetlands as protective barriers against these 
threats continually increases in importance.63  
 
III. Environmental Justice Concerns 
 
In addition to putting the public at large in danger, 
significant environmental justice concerns accompany the failure 
to protect coastal wetlands as protective barriers against sea level 
rise and coastal storms, as evidenced by Hurricanes Katrina and 
Sandy.64 
The environmental justice movement began in the 1980s 
to protect poor and minority communities from being harmed by 
lax environmental regulations in the context of hazardous waste 
disposal and water pollution control.65 The movement catalyzed 
                                               
58. See id. at 5–6 (outlining the historical South Atlantic Coastal 
wetlands stressors). 
59. See id. at 6 (reviewing the present-day South Atlantic Coastal 
wetlands stressors). 
60. See id. at 6. (analyzing NOAA data showing the different 
causes of losses to estuaries and wetlands). 
61. See id. at 7 (describing the movement of retirees and job 
seekers into coastal communities) 
62. See supra notes 54–61 and accompanying text.  
63. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text. 
64. See infra text accompanying notes 74–94 (detailing the 
environmental justice concerns related to coastal storm damage). 
65. See Raina Wagner, Adapting Environmental Justice: In the 
Age of Climate Change, Environmental Justice Demands A Combined 
 





after the U.S. General Accounting Office released a report 
demonstrating that three-fourths of the large commercial waste 
facilities in the Southeastern EPA Region IV were placed in 
minority communities.66 A follow-up study, conducted by the 
United Church of Christ, further demonstrated that there was a 
consistent statistical correlation between percentage of minority 
members in the community and the presence of a hazardous 
waste site.67 Furthermore, a National Law Journal study found 
disparate enforcement of federal environmental laws in minority 
communities, whereby environmental laws and regulations were 
not as strictly enforced in areas with large minority 
populations.68 In response to growing concerns about the 
inequitable burdens being placed on minority communities, 
President Clinton issued an Executive Order in 1994 directing 
each federal agency to “make achieving environmental justice 
part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, 
disproportionately high and adverse human health or 
environmental effects of its programs, policies and activities on 
minority populations and low-income populations.”69  
                                                                                                             
Adaptation-Mitigation Response, 2 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 153, 156–59 (2011) 
(describing the history of the Environmental Justice Movement). 
66. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. B-211461, SITING 
OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND 
ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES 3, available at 
http://archive.gao.gov/d48t13/121648.pdf (finding that three-quarters of the 
hazardous waste landfill sites in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee were located in 
primarily poor, African American and Latino communities) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
67. See BENJAMIN F. CHAVIS ET AL., UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST 
COMM’N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF 
COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 13 (1987), available at 
http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/unitedchurchofchrist/legacy_url/13567/to
xwrace87.pdf?1418439935 (“The first study found that the group of residential 
zip code areas with the highest number of commercial hazardous waste facilities 
also had the highest mean percentage of residents who belong to a racial and 
ethnic group.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
68. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: 
LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY (Vicki Been et. al. eds., 6th ed. 2009) (describing the 
disproportionate environmental burdens placed on minorities). 
69. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
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The EPA defines environmental justice as “the fair 
treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of 
race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the 
development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental 
laws, regulations, and policies.”70 The EPA recognizes that the 
goals of environmental justice “will be achieved when everyone 
enjoys the same degree of protection from environmental and 
health hazards and equal access to the decision-making process 
to have a healthy environment in which to live, learn, and 
work.”71 Despite widespread recognition of the environmental 
justice movement and the EPA’s inclusion of environmental 
justice concerns in its mission, the EPA has been criticized widely 
for its failure to adequately take environmental justice concerns 
into consideration.72  
The failure to implement environmental justice measures 
is disconcerting given the impending threat of extreme weather 
events caused by climate change.73 These severe weather systems 
will likely have a disproportionately negative impact on low-
income communities that lack the resources to adapt to changing 
conditions.74 This is particularly true in the South,75 where 
remnants of racial discrimination and Jim Crow laws have placed 
poor, minority communities in less desirable and higher risk 
                                               
70. Environmental Justice, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Sept. 12, 2013), 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/ (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
71. See id. (describing the EPA’s mission to support the 
environmental justice movement). 
72. See CHAVIS, supra note 67, at 6 (describing criticism of the 
EPA’s implementation of regulations such as CERCLA, commonly known as 
Superfund). 
73.  See Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A 
Climate Justice Proposal for A Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 
BUFF. L. REV. 169, 170 (2008) (“The federal response to the climate crisis—which 
has been both belated and insubstantial—has failed to take seriously the 
potentially devastating impacts of climate change and climate change policies 
on poor and of-color communities.”). 
74. See id. at 179 (“The environmental risks these communities 
disproportionately suffer . . . acquire a more dangerous hue when income is 
taken into account.”). 
75. See id. at 184–88 (discussing the historical vulnerability of 
southern minority communities, and accordingly how “distribution of climate 
change impacts is likely to be increasingly unjust”).  





geographic locations.76 For example, the “bottoms” is a term used 
to describe low-lying, and frequently flooded residential areas, 
which are usually occupied by African Americans in the South.77 
This was the case in New Orleans at the onset of Hurricane 
Katrina, where “[t]he area most vulnerable to floods, the Lower 
Ninth Ward, was ninety-eight percent black. By contrast, whites 
by and large lived on the land above sea level.”78 Consequent 
death and displacement left New Orleans more affluent and 
white.79 
Coincident to inhabiting areas most vulnerable to storm 
surge and flooding, poor, minority communities suffer the 
greatest during storm relief efforts80 and have greater difficulties 
recovering from disasters.81 Several reasons lead to this reality, 
including: “less insurance, lower incomes, fewer savings, more 
unemployment, less access to communication channels and 
information, and the intensification of existing poverty.”82 
Additionally, many poor individuals lack the education and skills 
                                               
76. See id. at 184–86 (“As a function of these policies and practices, 
particularly after slavery, black communities were forced to live in the least 
desirable parts of town.”). 
77. See id. at 185 (describing the role that discrimination plays in 
community placement). 
78. See id. (noting the disparate locations of New Orleans white 
and black populations). 
79. See Bill Quigley, Ten Months After Katrina: Gutting New 
Orleans, COMMON DREAMS (June 29, 2006), 
https://www.organicconsumers.org/news/ten-months-after-katrina-gutting-new-
orleans (“African-Americans, children, and the poor have not made it back - 
primarily because of severe shortages of affordable housing.”) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); 
MANUEL PASTOR ET AL., IN THE WAKE OF THE STORM: ENVIRONMENT, DISASTER, 
AND RACE AFTER KATRINA 9 (2006), available at 
http://www.racialequitytools.org/resourcefiles/pastor2.pdf (“Before Katrina, the 
city had 475,000 people with about 67 percent African American. Current 
estimates indicate that soon the population will be only 350,000 with only 35 to 
40 percent black.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
80. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 79, at 24 (noting that minority 
and poor storm victims were less likely to know how to access relief or navigate 
the relief system).  
81. See id. (“The inequities before and during a disaster are often 
played out further in the period after a disaster.”). 
82. See id. (listing several causes of increased suffering and 
difficulty for disaster-stricken minority populations). 
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necessary to navigate the relief system, fill out aid forms, and 
avail themselves of the bureaucratic process.83 
Following Hurricane Katrina, the House Subcommittee on 
Environment and Hazardous Materials held a hearing intended 
to assess the impacts of the Hurricane.84 In her statement before 
the Subcommittee, Dr. Beverly Wright explained, “communities 
of color receive less priority in response time than do their white 
counterparts where emergency response is required.”85 In the 
year after Hurricane Katrina, local and federal governments 
failed to pursue effective policies to protect residents’ health and 
failed to clean up toxic debris.86 These administrative failings 
drove local community groups to spearhead cleanup efforts even 
though they lacked sufficient resources to address the large-scale 
problems.87 
Poor, minority victims of Hurricane Sandy also suffered 
disproportionate hardship following the storm, particularly in the 
receipt of housing assistance.88 Governor Chris Christie’s 
administration came under severe criticism for failing to 
adequately provide for these communities during post-storm 
relief efforts: 
 
                                               
83. See id. (“Upper middle-class victims in several disasters have 
been more likely to receive assistance than minorities and the poor because they 
knew how to navigate the relief system . . . .”). 
84. See Hurricane Katrina: Assessing the Present Environmental 
Status: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Env’t & Hazardous Materials of the H. 
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 109th Cong. 99 (2005) (statement of Dr. Beverly 
Wright, Director, Deep South Center for Environmental Justice) (describing the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina). 
85. See id. at 98 (noting conclusions from historical analysis). 
86.  See Janell Smith & Rachel Spector, Environmental Justice, 
Community Empowerment and the Role of Lawyers in Post-Katrina New 
Orleans, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 277, 283 (2006) (“State and federal authorities 
have largely failed to clean up toxic sediments or pursue sustainable strategies 
for dealing with the debris left behind by the storms. Local community groups 
have had to step in to protect themselves and hold the government 
accountable.”). 
87. See id. at 288 (“Residents and volunteers removed several 
inches of topsoil and sediment from neighborhood yards and deposited them in 
an empty lot for FEMA removal; they then replaced the soil with fresh sod and 
river sand.”).  
88.  See Pastor, supra note 79, at 24 (“Past research has found that 
housing assistance favors middle-class victims, particularly homeowners.”). 





Only 24 percent of over 16,000 eligible low and 
moderate income households have received the 
$10,000 checks [they were entitled to]; according to 
the State’s data, only 4,051 checks have been 
distributed to low and moderate income 
households. Yet 6,914 higher income households 
received the checks, which [constitute] 36% of 
eligible higher income homeowners. A person who 
is in the higher income level in New Jersey is 
significantly more likely to get this $10,000 grant, 
despite Christie’s promise to the contrary in 
requesting federal funding.89 
 
Following a disaster, the issue of housing assistance is 
critical for minority communities.90 In general, minorities tend to 
have lower homeownership rates.91 Furthermore, minorities who 
do own homes often have more of their net worth invested in 
                                               
89. Laura Denker, Christie Fails to Keep Promise to Help Lower 
Income Families with Sandy Relief According to Document, FAIR SHARE HOUSING 
CENTER (Oct. 23, 2013), http://fairsharehousing.org/blog/entry/christie-fails-to-
keep-promise-to-help-lower-income-families-with-sandy-rel/ (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); see 
also Chris Frates, Feds Investigate Christie’s Use of Sandy Relief Funds, CNN, 
(Jan. 13, 2014, 7:40 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/13/politics/christie-feds-
investigating-sandy-ads/index.html (explaining that Christie’s administration is 
currently under investigation for diverting $25 million in Sandy relief funds for 
a marketing campaign promoting tourism in New Jersey) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
90. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 79, at 23 (“Housing continues to 
be a significant issue for low-income and minority disaster victims in the 
recovery period.”). 
91. See id. at 24 (referring to minority homeownership rates as 
“much lower . . . than their white counterparts”); see also CHRISTOPHER E. 
HERBERT, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., HOMEOWNERSHIP GAPS 
AMONG LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY BORROWERS AND NEIGHBORHOODS 140–41 
(2005), available at 
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/HomeownershipGapsAmongLow-
IncomeAndMinority.pdf (“As of 2003, the homeownership rate among whites 
was 26.6 percentage points higher than the black rate, 28.7 percentage points 
higher than the Hispanic rate, and 19.1 percentage points higher than the Asian 
rate. In comparison, in 1980 these gaps were 23.2, 25.1, and 16.5 percentage 
points, respectively.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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home equity than do white homeowners.92 Since the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency’s (“FEMA”) housing assistance 
programs were designed to assist traditional, nuclear families 
with one head of household, non-nuclear family units, in which 
many minority families live, pose an additional obstacle for relief 
efforts.93 These problems inevitably lead to increased 
homelessness and intensification of poverty.94  
Given the failure of reactionary storm relief efforts to 
protect environmental justice communities from 
marginalization,95 it is evident that a preventative approach to 
storm protection would be beneficial.96 By emphasizing the 
protection and supplementation of coastal wetlands as a means of 
diminishing storm damage preemptively, we may be better able 
to achieve the goal of realizing equal protection from 
environmental hazards.97  
 
IV. Federal Wetlands Protection and Regulation 
 
Despite clear evidence of wetland losses98 and recognition 
of the important role that wetlands play in protecting inland 
communities from storm damage,99 Congress has not yet enacted 
                                               
92.  See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 79, at 24 (describing how 
minority housing differs from non-minority housing); see also RAKESH KOCHHAR, 
ET. AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., TWENTY-TO-ONE: WEALTH GAPS RISE TO RECORD 
HIGHS BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS, HISPANICS 5–6 (2011), available at 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/07/SDT-Wealth-Report_7-26-
11_FINAL.pdf (finding for 2005 the rate of home equity contributing to net 
worth for whites, blacks, and Hispanics to be 44%, 59%, and 66% respectively). 
93. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 79, at 25 (“Following Hurricane 
Andrew, FEMA was not prepared for some of south Florida’s family structures, 
particularly Haitian families, who often had several families in one 
household . . . .”). 
94. See Burkett, supra note 73, at 186–87 (describing the “second 
disaster” phenomenon that impacts the poor and minority communities 
following severe storms).  
95. See supra notes 6472–94 and accompanying text.  
96. See supra notes 5169–71 and accompanying text. 
97.  See Environmental Justice, supra note 71 (describing the goals 
of the environmental justice movement).  
98. See supra notes 36–63 and accompanying text. 
99. See supra notes 46–63 and accompanying text. 





a comprehensive wetland protection statute.100 Instead, 
regulators rely on existing water pollution regulations to address 
wetland destruction.101  
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act,102 also known as 
the Clean Water Act (“CWA” or “Act”), is the main federal 
legislative vehicle for preventing and prohibiting wetland 
destruction.103 The purpose of the CWA is “to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation's waters.”104 Section 401 of the Act makes any discharge of 
a pollutant105 into the waters of the United States unlawful, 
unless made in compliance with a permit issued in accordance 
with the provisions of the Act.106 Notwithstanding continued 
uncertainty over the scope of federal authority to regulate the 
nation’s waters,107 it is clear that the Act includes navigable 
                                               
100. See NANCIE G. MARZULLA & ROGER J. MARZULLA, PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: UNDERSTANDING GOVERNMENT TAKINGS AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION 43 (1997) (describing the wetlands regulation system).  
101. See id. (“[I]nventive (and often well-intentioned) bureaucrats 
and political leaders try to force the square peg of wetlands protection into the 
round hole of pollution control, specifically, the point source discharge 
permitting scheme of the Clean Water Act.”). 
102. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). 
103. See id. §§ 1281(a), 1294–97 (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of 
dredge and fill material into wetlands without a permit). 
104. See id. § 1251(a) (outlining the general and derivative 
objectives of the CWA). 
105. See id. § 1362 (defining “pollutant” broadly to include, among 
other materials, dredged spoil, rock, sand, cellar dirt, and industrial waste). 
106. See id. § 1344 (prohibiting the discharge of dredge and fill 
material into the waters of the United States). 
107. A comprehensive review of the scope of Federal authority 
under the CWA is beyond the scope of this note. See generally United States v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (holding that federal 
jurisdiction exists over wetlands adjacent to navigable waters); Solid Waste 
Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) 
(holding that 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3)(1999), which extended Federal jurisdiction 
to waters that were used as a habitat by birds protected by the Migratory Bird 
Treaty exceeded the authority of the Clean Water Act); Rapanos v. United 
States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (holding that only wetlands with a with a 
continuous surface connection to navigable waters fell within the jurisdiction of 
the Clean Water Act); United States v. Freedman Farms, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 2d 
1016 (2011) (discussing the circuit split that has emerged in the circuit courts 
since the Rapanos decision).  
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waterways108 and at least those nonnavigable bodies of water, 
such as wetlands, that have a continuous surface connection to 
navigable waterways.109 Section 404 of the Act specifically 
addresses the discharge of dredged110 and fill material111 into 
wetlands by authorizing the Army Corps of Engineers (“Army 
Corps”) to issue permits allowing for such discharges.112  
In order to obtain a permit for development, applicants 
must demonstrate four conditions:113 (1) there is no “practicable 
alternative114 to the proposed discharge” that would be less 
damaging to the waterway;115 (2) the proposed activity will not 
cause or contribute to “significant degradation116 of the waters of 
the United States”;117 (3) “appropriate and practicable steps have 
                                               
108. See Freedman Farms, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 2d at 1017 (“The 
regulations define ‘waters of the United States’ to include . . . traditionally 
navigable waters . . . .”). 
109. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742 (delineating a two part test 
under which waters adjacent to navigable waters are covered by the CWA). 
110. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (2014) (“The term dredged material 
means material that is excavated or dredged from waters of the United 
States.”). 
111. See id. § 323.2(e)(1) (“[T]he term fill material means material 
placed in waters of the United States where the material has the effect of: (i) 
replacing any portion of a water of the United States with dry land; or (ii) 
changing the bottom elevation of any portion of a water of the United States.”). 
112. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2014) (“The Secretary may issue permits, 
after notice and opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of dredged or 
fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.”). 
113. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (2014) (outlining the permitting 
requirements). 
114. See id. § 230.10(a)(1) (defining “practicable alternatives” to 
“include . . . [a]ctivities which do not involve a discharge of dredged or fill 
material into the waters of the United States or ocean waters” and “[d]ischarges 
of dredged or fill material at other locations in waters of the United States or 
ocean waters”). 
115. See id. § 230.10(a) (prohibiting “discharge of dredged or fill 
material[,]” unless otherwise “provided [for] under section 404(b)(2)[,]” where a 
“practicable alternative to the proposed discharge . . . [that] does not have other 
significant adverse environmental consequences” exists).  
116. See id. § 230.10(c) (identifying “significant degradation” by 
evidence of “significantly adverse effects” on: “human health or welfare”; “life 
stages of aquatic life and other wildlife”; “aquatic ecosystem diversity, 
productivity, and stability”; or “recreational, aesthetic, and economic values”). 
117. See id. (proscribing “[e]xcept as provided under section 
404(b)(2),” any “discharge of dredged or fill material . . . which will cause or 
contribute to significant degradation of the waters of the United States”). 





been taken which will minimize potential adverse impacts of the 
discharge on the aquatic ecosystem”;118 and (4) the proposed 
discharge will not violate state water quality standards, effluent 
standards, the Endangered Species Act or the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act.119 
Failure to comply with § 404 permitting requirements120 
can result in an enforcement action brought by either the EPA or 
the Army Corps.121 Under the Act, both agencies have the 
authority to impose: (1) administrative orders (“cease and desist” 
orders) requiring property owners to immediately suspend 
operations; (2) civil enforcement proceedings; or (3) criminal 
penalties.122  
The burden of determining whether a particular piece of 
property falls within the Act’s jurisdiction rests with the property 
owner.123 However, as Senator Max Baucus (D-Montana) 
explained, “[i]t is difficult for the public to understand the 
program’s requirements and, therefore, how to comply with 
them. . . . It is often financially or technically difficult for small 
landowners to take the steps, such as identification and 
delineations of wetlands, necessary to even apply for a § 404 
permit . . . .”124 
                                               
118. See id. § 230.10(d) (allowing otherwise only “as provided under 
section 404(b)(2)”). 
119. See id. § 230.10(b) (listing external statutory and regulatory 
constraints). 
120. See supra notes 110–119 and accompanying text. 
121. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2014) (delineating state, federal, civil, 
and criminal enforcement of the CWA); 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2014) (granting 
authority to the EPA); 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2014) (granting authority to the 
Secretary of the Army acting through the Army Corps); see also Rapanos v. 
United States, 547 U.S. 715, 723 (2006) (discussing CWA grants of authority to 
the EPA and Army Corps); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 
U.S. 121, 135–39 (1985) (discussing the authority of the Army Corps).  
122. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(s) (2014) (setting forth penalties for the 
violation of permits); see also supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
123. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.5 (2014) (establishing permitting 
procedures applicable to property owners who discharge otherwise prohibited 
substances into waters regulated by the CWA). 
124. 139 CONG. REC. S9,721 (daily ed. July 28, 1993) (statement of 
Sen. Baucus). 
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To complicate matters further, the Act also assigns States 
concurrent authority to develop wetlands regulations.125 The EPA 
established seven core elements that each state is encouraged to 
adopt in order to create a comprehensive state regulatory 
program: (1) state laws, regulations, and programs;126 (2) 
monitoring and assessment;127 (3) restoration programs and 
activities;128 (4) water quality standards;129 (5) public-private 
partnerships; (6) coordination among state and federal agencies; 
and (7) education and outreach activities.130 Despite these 
                                               
125. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (“Federal agencies shall co-operate 
with state and local agencies to develop comprehensive solutions to prevent, 
reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with programs for managing water 
resources.”). 
126. See Regulation, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Sept. 12, 2013), 
http://water.epa.gov/grants_funding/wetlands/regulation.cfm (“Wetlands 
regulatory and permit programs in general consist of a few basic elements: a 
jurisdictional scope, a method to authorize impacts to aquatic resources and 
assess proposed authorizations, and a method of assuring compliance.”) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
127. See Monitoring and Assessment, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Sept. 
10, 2013), http://water.epa.gov/grants_funding/wetlands/monitoring.cfm 
(outlining a “three-tier framework” including: (1) “landscape assessments” using 
“GIS data” and “landscape disturbance indices to assess wetland condition;” 
(2) “rapid assessments . . . [of] relatively simple metrics to assess wetland 
condition;” and (3) “intensive site assessments . . . of biological taxa and/or 
hydrogeomorphic functions”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY CLIMATE AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
128. See Voluntary Restoration and Protection, ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY (Sept. 12, 2013), 
http://water.epa.gov/grants_funding/wetlands/restoration.cfm (illustrating 
regulatory and voluntary restoration programs) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
129. See Water Quality Standards for Wetlands, ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY (May 1, 2013), 
http://water.epa.gov/grants_funding/wetlands/quality.cfm (defining water 
quality standards and noting “regulations at 40 CFR Parts 131 and 132 provide 
specific requirements for development of state and tribal standards including 
specifying appropriate water uses to be achieved and protected, providing 
appropriate criteria to support those uses, and applying anti-degradation 
policy . . . .”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
130. See Wetlands: State, Tribal and Local Initiatives, ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY (May 20, 2013), http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/initiative_index.cfm 
(describing state, tribal, and local wetlands initiatives) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 





guidelines, state regulatory programs vary widely:131 some states 
take a water-quality based approach,132 some states take a 
habitat-focused permitting regime,133 and others take a non-
regulatory approach that focuses on education and outreach.134 
 
V. South Atlantic State Wetland Protection Programs 
 
A. North Carolina 
 
North Carolina contains approximately five million acres 
of wetlands; two and one-half million acres fewer than it 
contained before the arrival of western civilization.135 In order to 
protect remaining wetlands from further destruction,136 North 
Carolina has adopted the Coastal Area Management Act137 
(“CAMA”) “to provide a management system capable of 
preserving and managing the natural ecological conditions of the 
estuarine system, the barrier dune system, and the beaches, so as 
to safeguard and perpetuate their natural productivity and their 
                                               
131. See ENVTL. LAW INST., STATE WETLAND PROGRAM EVALUATION: 
PHASE IV, 8–9 (2007), available at http://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-
pubs/d17_17.pdf (commenting on scope of state law program variances) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
132. See id. at 1 (noting that this approach results from “relying on 
CWA §401, which authorizes states to determine whether activities permitted 
by the federal government are in accordance with state water quality laws and 
regulations”). 
133. See id. (noting that some states enact resource or habitat-
focused regimes in addition to § 401 water quality certification). 
134. See id. (“A multitude of reasons explain the differences we see 
among state wetland programs—history, geography, economics, politics, general 
attitudes toward aquatic resources, as well as state agency funding, resources, 
and enforcement activity.”). 
135. See ENVTL. LAW INST., STATE WETLAND PROTECTION: STATUS, 
TRENDS, & MODEL APPROACHES NORTH CAROLINA 2 (2008) [hereinafter ELI: 
NORTH CAROLINA], available at 
http://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/docs/core_states/North_Carolina.pdf (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT).  
136. See id. (“About 34 percent of the state’s wetland areas have 
been impacted over the past century by rapid urban and agricultural 
development, with the most extensive losses occurring in the last 30 years.”). 
137. N.C. GEN. STAT §§ 113A-100 to -134.3 (2014). 
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biological, economic and esthetic values.”138 CAMA requires 
developers in “Areas of Environmental Concern”139 to obtain a 
special permit from the North Carolina Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources’ Division of Coastal 
Management.140 CAMA specifies that Areas of Environmental 
Concern include coastal wetlands141 and contiguous areas 
necessary to protect those wetlands.142  
In addition to the permitting requirements outlined under 
the Clean Water Act and CAMA,143 North Carolina adopted the 
Riparian Area Buffer Rule144 in 1997, which is designed to protect 
and maintain a 50-foot buffer around intermittent or perennial 
streams, lakes, ponds, or estuaries.145 Under the rule, “Zone One, 
the inner 30 feet, is to remain undisturbed (with the exception of 
certain activities); and Zone Two, the outer 20 feet, must remain 
vegetated (with the exception of certain activities).”146 
In deploying the above described programs, North 
Carolina relies heavily on a comprehensive mitigation program 
for unavoidable wetland losses.147 Under this program, citizens 
pursuing development projects that are prohibited in the absence 
of mitigation activities can satisfy permitting requirements by: 
(1) contributing to the in-lieu fee program (the preferred method 
                                               
138. Id. § 113A-102. 
139. See id. at § 113A-113(b) (defining “Areas of Environmental 
Concern”). 
140. See ELI: NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 135, at 4 (describing the 
Coastal Area Management Act processes). 
141. See N.C. GEN. STAT § 113-229(n)(3) (2014) (defining coastal 
wetland as “any salt marsh or other marsh subject to regular or occasional 
flooding by tides, including wind tides (whether or not the tidewaters reach the 
marshland areas through natural or artificial watercourses), provided this shall 
not include hurricane or tropical storm tides”). 
142. See id. § 113A-113(b)(1) (expanding the scope of areas of 
environmental concern to include contiguous areas necessary to protect coastal 
wetlands). 
143. See supra notes 110–119, 140–142 and accompanying text 
(reviewing CWA and CAMA permitting requirements respectively). 
144. See 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2B.0233 (2014) (creating a 50-foot 
wide riparian buffer). 
145. See ELI: NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 135, at 4–5 (describing 
the riparian area buffer rule). 
146. Id. at 5. 
147. See id. at 8–10 (describing the North Carolina mitigation and 
restoration projects). 





of program participation); (2) participating in project-specific 
restoration, creation, enhancement, or preservation projects; or 
(3) contributing to private mitigation banking148 systems that 
comply with state standards.149  
An in-lieu fee program is a compensatory mitigation 
system in which debits are made against a person or entity that 
causes natural resources to be destroyed or impaired, and credits 
are given where a natural resource has been deemed to be 
improved or preserved.150 North Carolina offers four in-lieu fee 
(“ILF”) programs: the North Carolina Department of 
Transportation (“NCDOT”) Stream & Wetland ILF Program; the 
Statewide Stream & Wetland ILF Program; the Riparian Buffer 
Mitigation Program; and the Nutrient Offset Program.151 The 
NCDOT Stream & Wetland ILF Program provides off-site 
compensatory wetland and stream mitigation for permitted 
projects undertaken by the NCDOT.152 The Statewide Stream & 
Wetland ILF Program and the Riparian Buffer Mitigation 
Program entitle the Ecosystem Enhancement Program (“EEP”) to 
accept payments from applicants based on a set fee schedule to 
satisfy the mitigation requirements outlined in their permit.153 
Finally, the Nutrient Offset Program allows developers to “buy-
                                               
148. See Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, 
Mitigation Banking, and Takings, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 527, 531 (1996) (“Mitigation 
banking occurs when one restores, enhances, creates, or preserves wetlands, 
thereby generating mitigation credits. A regulatory agency determines the 
amount and value of the mitigation credits, which the credit generator then may 
use to offset the adverse wetland impacts of its own development projects.”). 
149. See ELI: NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 135, at 8 (describing the 
North Carolina mitigation and restoration projects).  
150. See EEP In-Lieu Fee Programs, NORTH CAROLINA ECOSYSTEM 
ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM, http://portal.ncdenr.org/web/eep/in-lieu-fee-programs 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2014) (describing North Carolina’s in-lieu fee system) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
151. See id. (“EEP offers four voluntary In-Lieu Fee (ILF) 
mitigation programs . . . . [which] offset unavoidable environmental damage 
from transportation-infrastructure improvements and other economic 
development, and help to prevent harmful pollutants from endangering water 
quality in sensitive river basins.”). 
152. See id. (describing the mitigation program). 
153. See id. (“The permit’s mitigation requirement is then 
transferred to EEP, which implements stream and wetland mitigation projects 
to satisfy the requirements.”). 
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down” their nutrient loading requirements by paying the EEP to 
take responsibility for “mitigation site construction and 
monitoring of buffer-restoration sites or other types of nutrient-
offset projects.”154 
For individuals who choose to participate in project-
specific mitigation, the State notes that the mitigation efforts 
“should take place within the same river basin and physiographic 
province of the impacted wetlands, and within the same water 
supply watershed for some classes of waters.”155 The State also 
encourages in-kind mitigation where practicable, unless another 
form of mitigation would provide greater environmental 
benefit.156 In-kind mitigation refers to mitigation projects that 
create or restore the same type of wetland destroyed by the 
development project; for example, if a project destroys nontidal 
wetlands the mitigation project must work to create or restore 
nontidal wetlands.157 
 
B. South Carolina 
 
Although estimates indicate that rates of wetland loss in 
South Carolina are lower than in other states, twenty-seven 
percent of the state’s wetlands have disappeared since the mid-
1700s.158 The South Carolina Department of Health and 
Environmental Control159 (“SCDHEC”) administers South 
Carolina’s wetlands regulations and the Clean Water Act §§ 401 
                                               
154. Id. 
155. ELI: NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 135, at 8. 
156.  See id. at 9 (explaining the regulations allowance of creation 
and preservation projects). 
157.  See Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, 
Mitigation Banking, and Takings, 81 IOWA L. REV. 527, 537 (1996) (outlining 
the utility of in-kind mitigation projects). 
158. ENVTL. LAW INST., STATE WETLAND PROTECTION: STATUS, 
TRENDS, & MODEL APPROACHES SOUTH CAROLINA 1 (2008) [hereinafter ELI: 
SOUTH CAROLINA], available at 
http://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/docs/core_states/South_Carolina.pdf 
(describing wetland losses in South Carolina) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND 
LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
159. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-1-20 (2013) (controlling the existence 
and structure of the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental 
Control). 





and 404 permits.160 In reviewing a permit application, the issuing 
administrator must consider: whether the proposed activity is 
water-dependent; the purpose of the activity; the feasibility of 
alternatives to the activity; and all potential water quality 
impacts of the project.161 Water quality impacts include the “(1) 
impact on existing and classified water uses; (2) physical, 
chemical, and biological impacts, including cumulative impacts; 
(3) the effect on circulation patterns and water movement; (4) the 
cumulative impacts of the proposed activity and reasonably 
foreseeable similar activities of the applicant and others.”162 
The primary state legislation regulating wetlands is the 
Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”).163 The purpose of the 
CZMA is to “protect the quality of the coastal environment and to 
promote the economic and social improvement of the coastal zone 
and of all the people of the State.”164 CZMA requires property 
owners to obtain a permit before utilizing or developing critical 
areas.165 The act defines “critical areas” to include coastal 
waters;166 tidelands;167 beaches;168 and the beach/dune system.169 
                                               
160. See ELI: SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 158, at 4 (“Any actions 
that require a federal permit, license, or approval that results in a discharge 
into waters of the state, including § 404 individual dredge and fill permits and 
nationwide permits outside the coastal zone, require state water quality 
certification.”). 
161. See S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 61-101(F)(3)(a)–(c) (2013) 
(establishing the permitting process). 
162. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 61-101(F)(3)(c) (2013). 
163. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to -360 (2011). 
164. See id. § 48-39-30(A) (noting the basic state policy in 
implementation of the CZMA is protection of the costal environment and 
promotion of the economic and social improvement of the coastal zone). 
165. See id. § 48-39-130 (outlining the permitting requirements of 
the CZMA). 
166.  See id. § 48-39-10(F) (“‘Coastal waters’ means the navigable 
waters of the United States subject to the ebb and flood of the tide and which 
are saline waters, shoreward to their mean high-water mark.”). 
167. See id. § 48-39-10(G) (“‘Tidelands’ means all areas which are at 
or below mean high tide and coastal wetlands, mudflats, and similar areas that 
are contiguous or adjacent to coastal waters and are an integral part of the 
estuarine systems involved.”). 
168. See id. § 48-39-10(H) (“‘Beaches’ means those lands subject to 
periodic inundation by tidal and wave action so that no nonlittoral vegetation is 
established.”). 
169. See id. § 48-39-10(J)(4) (“[T]he area from the mean high-water 
mark to the setback line as determined in Section 48-39-280.”). 
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The Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (“OCRM”) division 
of the SCDHEC receives approximately 1,000 permit applications 
each year, only three to five percent of which are denied.170 
However, the OCRM frequently attaches special conditions to 
permits to ensure the project’s compliance with the Coastal 
Management Program developed by the OCRM.171 
With regard to mitigation, South Carolina has failed to 
adopt a traditional rule-based system.172 Instead, it relies on 
“Wetlands Mitigation Guidelines” to aid permit applicants in 
developing an individualized mitigation plan that must be 
approved by the OCRM.173 Under the guidelines, applicants are 
permitted to choose among the three distinct mitigation 
options.174 First, applicants can work to protect and enhance the 
wetland system through the creation of either inland buffers or 
open water buffers that serve as a bulwark against degradation 
of the wetland.175 “[Inland] buffers are non-jurisdiction areas 
adjacent to wetland systems which will be left 
undisturbed. . . . [Open water buffers are] systems constructed 
adjacent to wetlands [that] can be used as buffers provided that 
the hydrologic regime of the wetland is not altered.”176 Second, 
applicants may create a new wetland system by converting inland 
                                               
170. See ELI: SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 158, at 3 (describing the 
permit approval process under the CZMA). 
171. See id. (describing OCRM’s role in the permitting process). 
172. See id. at 5 (“[T]he Bureau of Water follows a non-rule 
standard operating procedure developed by South Carolina’s Mitigation 
Banking Review Team (MBRT) that directs the Bureau to consider the qualities 
of the impact site, as well as the proposed mitigation site, to determine the 
proper ratio of mitigation.”). 
173. See SOUTH CAROLINA DEP’T OF HEALTH AND ENVTL. CONTROL, 
WETLANDS MITIGATION GUIDELINES 1, available at 
http://www.dhec.sc.gov/HomeAndEnvironment/Docs/Mitigation_Guidelines.pdf 
(“A mitigation plan must be submitted by the applicant and approved by DHEC 
OCRM for all projects which: (1) require a State CZC, and (2) impact federally 
defined jurisdictional freshwater wetlands in the coastal zone, unless DHEC 
OCRM determines that the impacts are so minimal as not to warrant 
mitigation.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
174. See id. at 2–5 (describing the mitigation options that 
applicants may choose from). 
175. See id. at 2–3 (describing the requirements for a proposal to 
enhance a wetland system with buffers). 
176. Id. at 2. 





areas into new wetlands.177 However, a qualified professional 
wetland scientist, who can assure reasonable success in the 
wetland’s creation, must design the wetland creation plan and 
must take place on a suitable site (prior converted wetlands, cut-
overs, agricultural lands, or very young forest stands).178 Third, 
applicants can elect to restore a degraded wetland system on 
lands that were previously modified by “man-made changes in 
vegetation, hydrology, or soils.”179 Beyond these general 
guidelines for mitigation projects, South Carolina has not 




Georgia’s extensive wetland management system has left 
the State’s 7.7 million acres of wetlands in excellent condition.181 
Georgia’s great success in implementing a comprehensive 
wetland protection program is, in large part, due to the fact that 
the state owns the majority of coastal marshlands.182 
In Georgia, the Environmental Protection Division 
(“EPD”) of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (“GA 
DNR”) issues CWA permits.183 The EPD reviews and approves 
approximately seventy to eighty applications each year,184 
although it often attaches specific conditions to approved 
                                               
177. See id. at 3–4 (describing the requirements for a proposal to 
create new wetlands). 
178. See id. at 3 (outlining suitable wetland creation projects). 
179. See id. at 4–5 (describing the requirements for a proposal to 
restore previously degraded wetlands). 
180.  See ELI: SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 158, at 8 (explaining the 
lack of state action in wetland restoration). 
181. See ENVTL. L. INST., ST. WETLAND PROTECTION: STATUS, TRENDS, 
& MODEL APPROACHES GEORGIA 2 (2008) [hereinafter ELI: GEORGIA], available at 
http://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/docs/core_states/Georgia.pdf (describing the 
regulatory regimes designed to protect Georgia’s coastal wetlands) (on file with 
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
182. See id. (explaining that Georgia’s coastal wetlands are largely 
publicly owned and managed). 
183. See id. at 3 (describing the wetland development permitting 
process in Georgia). 
184. See id. (stating the number of certifications issued by the EPD 
annually). 
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permits.185 Past conditions have included: “the requirement of a 
pre-construction notification for several [nationwide permits 
(NWPs)]; compensatory mitigation specifications; prohibition of 
NWPs for non-linear projects resulting in bank to bank filling, 
relocating, and/or culverting of more than 300 feet of stream; and 
the requirement that all projects must comply with Georgia’s 
Erosion and Sediment Control Act.”186  
In deciding whether to issue a permit, the EPD must use a 
combination of professional judgment and thorough analysis of 
state law.187 Additionally, under Georgia’s Federal Consistency 
Certification program, all federal licenses and permits issued for 
activities taking place in Georgia’s eleven coastal counties must 
be accompanied by “a statement certifying that the federally 
permitted or federally funded project has been designed to meet 
all State and local laws and that all necessary State permits have 
been obtained.”188 
In 1970, Georgia enacted the Coastal Marshland 
Protection Act (“CMPA”), which established additional permitting 
requirements for coastal properties.189 When requesting a permit, 
the applicant must prove to the state Coastal Marshal Protection 
Committee that the proposed project is not contrary to the public 
interest.190 In considering the public interest, the committee must 
look to:  
 
(1) Whether or not unreasonably harmful 
obstruction to or alteration of the natural flow of 
navigational water within the affected area will 
                                               
185. See id. (“All of the project applications received by [the 
Environmental Protection Division] are approved for certification, although the 
division may apply conditions or work with permit applicants to modify projects 
to meet state requirements.”). 
186. Id. at 7. 
187. See id. at 3 (describing the EPD permitting process). 
188. See Federal Consistency, COASTAL RES DIV. GA DEPT. OF 
NATURAL RES., http://www.coastalgadnr.org/msp/fedneed (last visited Nov. 26, 
2014) (describing the purpose of a Federal Consistency Certificate) (on file with 
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
189. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-280 to -297 (2013) (outlining 
permitting processes for coastal properties). 
190. See id. § 12-5-286(h) (“It is the responsibility of the applicant to 
demonstrate to the committee that the proposed alteration is not contrary to the 
public interest and that no feasible alternative sites exist.”). 





arise as a result of the proposal; (2) Whether or not 
unreasonably harmful or increased erosion, 
shoaling of channels, or stagnant areas of water 
will be created; and (3) Whether or not the granting 
of a permit and the completion of the applicant's 
proposal will unreasonably interfere with the 
conservation of fish, shrimp, oysters, crabs, clams, 
or other marine life, wildlife, or other resources, 
including but not limited to water and oxygen 
supply.191 
 
Under this section of the Act, the amount of coastal 
wetlands to be filled must be minimal.192 Furthermore, the 
statute identifies the following activities as presumptively 
against the public interest: the filling of marshlands for 
residential, commercial, and industrial uses; the filling of 
marshlands for private parking lots and private roadways; 
construction of dump sites and depositing of any waste materials 
or dredge spoil; construction of structures which constitute an 
obstruction of view to adjoining riparian landowners, including 
signs and enclosures.193 Because of these statutory constraints, 
less than fifty permits are granted each year and usually relate 
only to minor construction projects.194  
In addition to these statutory restrictions, Georgia 
maintains strict regulations for inland components of 
developments.195 These regulations require that permit 
applicants clearly delineate a boundary for their development 
project so that the Coastal Marshlands Protection Committee can 
                                               
191. Id. § 12-5-286(g). 
192. See id. § 12-5-288(b) (“The amount of marshlands to be altered 
must be minimum in size.”). 
193. See id. § 12-5-288(b) (listing activities and structures that are 
considered contrary to the public interest of Georgia when located in coastal 
marshlands). 
194. See ELI: GEORGIA, supra note 181, at 4 (noting that the only 
permits that are approved are related to the building of docks or minor 
construction activities). 
195. See GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 391-2-3.02 (2013) (“This Chapter 
establishes procedures and criteria to be applied by the Coastal Marshlands 
Protection Committee when reviewing applications for a permit to remove, fill, 
dredge, drain, or otherwise alter any marshlands or construct or locate any 
structure on or over marshlands within the estuarine area of the state.”). 
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verify the extent of the impact that the project will have.196 The 
regulations also establish a fifty-foot horizontal buffer from the 
“coastal marshland-upland interface . . . so as to ensure the 
project does not result in the filling or other alteration of the 
coastal marshlands.”197 Additionally, applicants must certify that 
they will comply with all soil and erosion responsibilities, which 
include storm water management measures, impervious surface 
coverage standards, and marshlands buffer design and 
maintenance measures.198 
Finally, although the State has not adopted formal 
legislation or regulations regarding wetlands mitigation, the 
Georgia Department of Natural Resources has established 
guidelines for mitigation requirements and the Army Corps has 
partnered with the Georgia Land Trust Service Center to create 




By the mid-1970s, nearly half of Florida’s wetlands were 
destroyed. 200 In order to combat this erosion, the state enacted a 
comprehensive wetland protection program, which includes the 
Environmental Resource Permit (“ERP”) program established 
under the Florida Environmental Reorganization Act of 1993,201 
the Dennis L. Jones Beach and Shore Preservation Act,202 
                                               
196. See id. at 391-2-3.02(3) (describing the procedure for 
determining project boundaries). 
197. Id. at 391-2-3.02(4)(a). 
198. See id. at 391-2-3-.02(4)(b) (delineating the soil and erosion 
control responsibilities of applicants). 
199. See ELI: GEORGIA, supra note 181, at 8 (“The Georgia Wetlands 
Trust Fund will be funded by payments from permit applicants for the costs 
associated with purchasing, managing, and preserving wetlands required for 
mitigation under the §404 permit application process.”). 
200. ENVTL. LAW INST., ST.STATE WETLAND PROTECTION: STATUS, 
TRENDS, & MODEL APPROACHES FLORIDA 2 (2008) [hereinafter ELI: FLORIDA], 
available at http://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/docs/core_states/Florida.pdf 
(“Historically, the State of Florida contained an estimated 20 million acres of 
diverse wetland types. However, by the mid-1970s, Florida’s wetlands had 
decreased to approximately 11 million acres, about 31 percent of the state’s 
surface area.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
201. See FLA. STAT. §§ 403.801–.8163 (2014). 
202. See FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011–.242, .25–.45 (2014). 





Florida’s Coastal Zone Protection Act,203 and a comprehensive 
land acquisition program.204  
The Environmental Reorganization Act operates to 
increase efficiency and effectiveness of governmental regulation 
by delegating permitting functions related to water quality to the 
water management districts.205 The statute delegates the 
administration of the ERP program to the Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection (“FLDEP”), the water management 
districts, and local governments, who divide implementation 
responsibilities according to Operating Agreements.206 When 
reviewing permit applications, the FLDEP and water 
management districts consider the following criteria: “avoidance 
and minimization of any potential adverse impacts; verification of 
compliance with surface and groundwater quality standards; 
consideration of direct, secondary, and cumulative impacts to 
water resources, and, for activities located in wetlands and other 
surface waters, confirmation that the project is not contrary to 
the public interest.”207  
The Beach and Shore Preservation Act requires a 
coordinated review of coastal construction projects by the Bureau 
of Beaches and Coastal Systems.208 In reviewing permit 
applications, the bureau must consider the engineering data 
concerning shoreline topography and stability; the design 
features of the proposed structures; and the potential effects of 
the location of such structures.209 
                                               
203. See FLA. STAT. § 161.52–.58 (2014). 
204. See ELI: FLORIDA, supra note 200, at 3 (“Florida has 
established a comprehensive regulatory program designed to achieve the 
programmatic and project-permitting goal of no net loss in wetland or other 
surface water functions.”). 
205. See FLA. STAT. § 403.802 (2014) (delegating permitting 
responsibility to the water management district). 
206.  See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-330, 62-341, 62-343, 40B-4, 
40B-400, 40C-4, 40C-41, 40D-4, 40D-40, 40D-400, 40E-4, 40E-41 (establishing 
operating agreements that govern implementation responsibilities).  
207. See ELI: FLORIDA, supra note 200, at 4 (describing the FLDEP 
and WMD step-by-step methodology in reviewing ERPs and wetland resource 
permit applications). 
208. See id. at 6 (reviewing the Beach and Shore Preservation Act 
requirements); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011–161.242 (2014). 
209. See FLA. STAT. §§ 161.041(2)(a)–(c) (2014) (describing 
“[a]dequate engineering data concerning inlet and shoreline stability and storm 
tides related to shoreline topography”). 
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Florida’s Coastal Zone Protection Act addresses “the most 
sensitive portion of the coastal area” by implementing “strict 
construction standards in order to minimize damage to the 
natural environment, private property, and life.”210 The act states 
that minor structures and non-habitable major structures built 
within the coastal building zone211 must “be designed to produce 
the minimum adverse impact on the beach and the dune 
system.”212 Furthermore, these structures must “be located a 
sufficient distance landward of the beach to permit natural 
shoreline fluctuations and to preserve dune stability.”213 
Finally, in the Florida Coastal Management Act, the 
Florida State Legislature recognized land acquisition as an 
important part of wetland preservation efforts.214 Notably, they 
explained that “[r]emoving coastal properties from the pool of 
developable acreage reduces the adverse land use and 
environmental impacts the state coastal zone management 
program is attempting to eliminate or diminish, while at the 
same time minimizing public expenditures and reducing risk to 
life and property in storm-prone coastal areas.”215 The primary 
vehicle for accomplishing the goal of land acquisition and 
management in the state is the Florida Forever program, which 
dedicates $300 million each year to land acquisition and 
restoration.216  
 
VI. Regulatory Takings 
 
Because the right to improve property is a fundamental 
property right, the above described development regulations give 
rise to claims of taking by regulation when they direct the states 
to deny development permits or condition permit approval on 
                                               
210. FLA. STAT. § 161.53(5) (2014). 
211. See FLA. STAT. § 161.54(1) (2014) (defining the coastal building 
zone). 
212.  FLA. STAT. § 161.55(1)–(2) (2014). 
213. FLA. STAT. § 161.55(3) (2014). 
214. See FLA. STAT. § 380.21(4) (2014) (“The Legislature recognizes 
that land acquisition has great potential to support the state's coastal 
management and regulatory efforts.”). 
215. Id. § 380.21(4). 
216. See ELI: FLORIDA, supra note 200200, at 14 (describing the 
Florida Forever program). 





owner-undertaken action.217 The Fifth Amendment provides that 
“private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”218 The Fourteenth Amendment extends this 
obligation to the states.219 The most obvious application of this 
right is in the context of eminent domain; however, the 
amendments have been interpreted to include non-physical 
takings of property.220 In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,221 
Justice Holmes explained that “while property may be regulated 
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized 
as a taking.”222 Holmes reasoned that extensive regulatory action 
constitutes a taking because it prohibits the property owner from 
realizing the full economic value of his/her property.223  
Although the Supreme Court has struggled to articulate a 
clear delineating line between the protection of private property 
rights and the government’s interest in regulating land use, it set 
forth an ad hoc, factual inquiry test in the landmark case Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.224 The three part 
test requires the Court to consider: (1) the extent of the economic 
impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which 
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations of the property owner; and (3) the nature and 
character of the governmental action.225  
The most prominent cases demonstrating the application 
of the takings clause to conditional land use permitting are 
                                               
217. See infra notes 226–243 (describing application of the takings 
clause to conditional land use permitting ). 
218. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
219. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“. . . [N]or shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
220. See DARREN BOTELLO-SAMSON, REGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 37 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2010) (explaining that non-physical 
takings occur “where regulations leave property in the hands of the owner but 
remove either economic value or particular instances of property rights”). 
221. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).  
222. Id. at 415. 
223. See id. at 414 (“To make it commercially impracticable to mine 
certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as 
appropriating or destroying it.”). 
224. See 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (holding that the New York City's 
Landmarks Law did not effect a taking of the appellants’ property). 
225. See id. at 124 (establishing the ad hoc test for determining 
when a taking has occurred). 
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Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,226 Dolan v. City of 
Tigard,227 and Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist.228 
Although the Court has not explained how much weight to give 
each factor in the Penn Central test,229 in each of these cases the 
Court has proven to be less deferential to the policy decisions of 
state legislators, and increasingly protective of economic 
freedom.230  
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the 
California Coastal Commission required property owners to 
provide a lateral easement across their property as a condition of 
approval for a rebuilding permit.231 The Court ruled that, in order 
for a conditional permitting requirement to survive a takings 
claim, there must be an essential nexus between the legitimate 
state interest and the permit condition exacted from the property 
owner.232 The Court went on to hold that the state could not 
condition the building permit at issue on the granting of a public 
easement because the state’s interest in providing the public with 
ocean views was not furthered by the easement, and the 
easement standing alone would constitute an unconstitutional 
taking.233  
In implementing the “essential nexus” test, the Court 
originally looked merely to the rational basis standard to 
evaluate the relationship between the condition and the state 
interest.234 However, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Court 
expanded upon Nollan’s essential nexus test, by requiring a 
                                               
226.  483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
227. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
228. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
229. See BOTELLO-SAMSON, supra note 220, at 39–40 (describing the 
repercussions of the ad hoc Penn Central test). 
230. See id. at 41–42 (describing a doctrinal shift in the courts 
reasoning). 
231. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828 (outlining the facts of the case). 
232. See id. at 837 (“When that essential nexus is eliminated, the 
situation becomes the same as if California law forbade shouting fire in a 
crowded theater, but granted dispensations to those willing to contribute $100 
to the state treasury.”). 
233. See id. at 838–41 (“It is quite impossible to understand how a 
requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to walk across 
the Nollans’ property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the 
new house.”). 
234. See BOTELLO-SAMSON supra note 220, at 42 (describing the 
historical application of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission). 





rough proportionality between the exaction sought and the public 
purpose being promoted.235 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist explained, “no precise mathematical calculation is 
required, but the city must make some sort of individualized 
determination that the required dedication is related both in 
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”236  
The Court found that the exaction of a recreational 
easement, which was intended to increase the floodplain adjacent 
to the property, did not have an essential nexus to the 
construction project, because the proposed development did not 
encroach upon existing greenway space.237 The Court found that 
the exaction of an easement for a pedestrian pathway did meet 
the essential nexus test, because the state had a legitimate 
interest in decreasing traffic congestion and the pedestrian 
pathway promoted that goal.238 However, the exaction failed the 
rough proportionality test, because the city did not demonstrate 
that the additional traffic that would be generated by the 
proposed development was reasonably related in scope to the 
required easement.239 In reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist explained “[t]he findings of fact that the bicycle 
pathway system ‘could offset some of the traffic demand’ is a far 
cry from a finding that the bicycle pathway system will, or is 
likely to, offset some of the traffic demand.”240 
In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., Coy A. 
Koontz brought suit to challenge the water management district’s 
                                               
235. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (“We 
think a term such as ‘rough proportionality’ best encapsulates what we hold to 
be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
236. Id. at 391. 
237. See id. at 394–95 (“We conclude that the findings upon which 
the city relies do not show the required reasonable relationship between the 
floodplain easement and the petitioner's proposed new building.”). 
238. See id. at 395 (“With respect to the pedestrian/bicycle pathway, 
we have no doubt that the city was correct in finding that the larger retail sales 
facility proposed by petitioner will increase traffic on the streets of the Central 
Business District.”). 
239. See id. (“[O]n the record before us, the city has not met its 
burden of demonstrating that the additional number of vehicle and bicycle trips 
generated by petitioner’s development reasonably relate to the city’s 
requirement for a dedication of the pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement.”). 
240. See id. (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 447 (Or. 
1993) (Peterson, J., dissenting)). 
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conditional permit approval for his development project.241 To 
satisfy the conditions of the permit approval, Koontz could either 
“reduce the size of his development to 1 acre and deed to the 
District a conservation easement on the remaining 13.9 acres. . . . 
[or] he could proceed with the development as proposed . . . if he 
also agreed to hire contractors to make improvements to District-
owned land several miles away.”242 The Supreme Court held that 
the nexus and proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan 
apply to the monetary exaction at issue in the second condition 
and remanded the case for further consideration.243 
On the one hand, this decision seems reasonable; property 
owners should only have to pay for mitigation projects to the 
extent that their development project causes wetland 
degradation.244 In fact, a literal reading of the nexus and 
proportionality requirements could be used to further effective 
wetlands protection programs.245 As mentioned earlier, the 
essential nexus and rough proportionality tests require that the 
exaction be “related both in nature and extent to the impact of 
the proposed development.”246 A literal reading of this text 
implies that the monetary exactions must be used for in-kind 
mitigation (a project to replenish the same type of wetland that is 
being destroyed by the permitted development).247 This 
interpretation could be incredibly beneficial for coastal protection, 
because it would ensure the maintenance of diverse types of 
wetlands, each of which plays a unique role in preventing 
ecosystem degradation.248 North Carolina already has recognized 
                                               
241. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 
2586, 2591 (2013) (outlining the facts of the case). 
242. Id. at 2592–93. 
243. See id. at 2595 (“Under Nollan and Dolan the government may 
choose whether and how a permit applicant is required to mitigate the impacts 
of a proposed development, but it may not leverage its legitimate interest in 
mitigation to pursue governmental ends that lack an essential nexus and rough 
proportionality to those impacts.”). 
244. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 (“One of the principal purposes of 
the Takings Clause is ‘to bar Government from forcing some people alone to 
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole.’” (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 
(1960))). 
245. See infra text accompanying notes 248–249. 
246. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
247. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
248. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 





the superiority of an in-kind mitigation system, and has 
incorporated in-kind mitigation into its wetlands protection 
program.249  
On the other hand, the Koontz decision will have far 
reaching effects on the regulatory regimes established in the 
South Atlantic States.250 The potential for regulatory takings 
liability has a distinct chilling effect on governmental regulation 
of real property.251 As Justice Kagan warned in her dissenting 
opinion, this decision will likely discourage state authorities from 
discussing or negotiating conditional permitting options for fear 
of crushing litigation costs.252 Therefore, the case may severely 
restrict the government’s ability to condition permit approvals on 
mitigation projects, thus undermining one of the key components 
of the state regulatory programs in North Carolina, Georgia, and 
Florida.253  
Additionally, the Koontz holding presents the practical 
difficulty of calculating a mitigation fee that is roughly 
proportional to the harm caused by the development project.254 It 
is nearly impossible to accurately account for the peripheral costs 
caused by the destruction of wetlands in areas that are crucial to 
coastal protection.255 These peripheral costs include state funding 
                                               
249. See supra notes 147–148 and accompanying text. 
250. See supra Part V. (describing existing mitigation programs). 
251. See Robin Kundis Craig, Public Trust and Public Necessity 
Defenses to Takings Liability for Sea Level Rise Responses on the Gulf Coast, 26 
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 395, 432 (2011). 
252. See Koontz v. St. John’s River Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.Ct. 2586, 
2611 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing St. John’s River Mgmt. Dist. v. 
Koontz, 77 So.3d 1220, 1231 (Fla. 2011)) (discussing the options of a District’s 
attorney when a permit does not satisfy legal requirements). 
253. See supra Part V (describing the current state regulatory 
programs). 
254. See John D. Echeverria, A Legal Blow to Sustainable 
Development, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/opinion/a-legal-blow-to-sustainable-
development.html?_r=1& (explaining that the courts will no longer defer to the 
local government to determine proportionality, instead allowing developers to 
challenge the mitigation fees) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
255. See Carys A. Arvidson, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water 
Management District: Will It Impact Mitigation Conditions in § 404 Permits?, 
44 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10886, 10895 (2014) (describing the 
variation of mitigation credits and in-lieu fees between states and between 
different types of wetlands). 
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for emergency response programs, and the additional burden on 
governmental assistance funds caused by the intensification of 
poverty associated with coastal storms.256  
 
VII. Public Necessity Defense 
 
In order to combat the negative implications of the Koontz 
decision, and to adequately protect the rights of poor, minority 
individuals, courts should extend the application of the public 
necessity defense to the context of regulatory takings where the 
state can show that the destruction of coastal wetlands will 
expose vulnerable communities to harm from hurricanes and sea 
level rise.257 
 
A. Elements of the Defense and Traditional Applications 
 
The public necessity defense is a common law defense, 
which provides that private property rights are subjugated by 
public need in times of imminent peril to the public at large.258 
Although the defense applies in several varying contexts, 
including as a defense to temporary trespass, this Note focuses on 
the doctrine’s application to cases of destruction of property.259 As 
Prosser and Keeton explained in their famous treatise, Prosser 
and Keeton on Torts, “[w]here the danger affects the entire 
community, or so many people that the public interest is 
involved, that interest serves as a complete justification to the 
defendant who acts to avert the peril to all.”260 The peril to be 
averted in these cases may either be the danger of destruction of 
property, or the danger of losing life, health, or limb.261  
                                               
256. See supra Part III (describing the needs of at risk communities 
and the importance of governmental emergency response programs). 
257. See infra Part VII.B (arguing that the cases involving wetland 
regulation are analogous to the traditional applications of the defense). 
258. See infra Part VII.B at 42 (explaining the utility of the doctrine 
of public necessity in insulating state and local coastal regulation from 
landowner claims of regulatory takings). 
259. See infra notes 266–307 and accompanying text. 
260. PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 24 (5th ed. 1984). 
261. See John Alan Cohan, Private and Public Necessity and the 
Violation of Property Rights, 83 N.D. L. REV. 651, 690 (2007) (describing the 
situations in which the public necessity defense may be invoked). 





In order for the public necessity defense to apply as a 
complete justification for the destruction of property, the actor 
must reasonably believe that their action is necessary to avert an 
imminent public disaster.262 This can be separated into two basic 
elements: (1) the disaster must generally be imminent or 
impending,263 and (2) the actions must be reasonably necessary to 
accomplish the goal of averting the disaster.264 
 
1. Cases of Fire, Flood and Contagious Disease 
 
Cases addressing the state’s response to fire, flood, and 
contagious disease demonstrate the most conventional 
applications of the public necessity defense.265 In fact, many 
jurists regard the right to destroy property to prevent the spread 
of fire as one of the highest laws of necessity, and a basic human 
right.266 In Surroco v. Geary, the city demolished a house and 
store in order to prevent the spread of fire in San Francisco.267 
The damage was assessed at $65,000 and the plaintiffs brought 
suit for recovery under the Fifth Amendment.268 Evidence 
presented at trial showed that the building would have been 
destroyed by the fire had it not been destroyed by the city.269 
However, plaintiff argued that he would have been able to 
remove more, if not all, of his goods and possessions from the 
                                               
262. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (1965). 
263. See id. at cmt. a (“It is essential therefore that the entry be 
made in order to protect against or repel a public enemy, or to prevent or 
mitigate the effects of an impending public disaster such as a conflagration, 
flood, earthquake, or pestilence.”). 
264. See id. and accompanying text. 
265. See Cohan supra note 261, at 719–28 (reviewing the cases 
involving the public necessity defense cited by the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts). 
266. See Surroco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69, 73 (1853) (“The right to 
destroy property, to prevent the spread of a conflagration, has been traced to the 
highest law of necessity, and the natural rights of man, independent of society 
or civil government.”). 
267. See id. at 70 (explaining the circumstances leading to the 
taking). 
268. See id. (describing the nature of the plaintiff’s loss). 
269. See id. (“The proof was, however, that the fire in a very few 
minutes reached the site of the building, and extended beyond it, and that its 
destruction would have been certain if it had not been blown up.”). 
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building had it not been destroyed prematurely.270 The court 
found for the city and denied recovery on the theory that 
destroying the property was necessary to protect the public.271 In 
deciding the case, Chief Justice Murray of the Supreme Court of 
California noted:  
 
A house on fire, or those in its immediate vicinity, 
which serve to communicate the flames, becomes a 
nuisance, which it is lawful to abate, and the 
private rights of the individual yield to the 
considerations of general convenience, and the 
interests of society. Were it otherwise, one stubborn 
person might involve a whole city in ruin, by 
refusing to allow the destruction of a building 
which would cut off the flames and check the 
progress of the fire, and that, too, when it was 
perfectly evident that his building must be 
consumed.272 
 
In Newcomb v. Tisdale,273 the Supreme Court of California 
considered whether cutting a levee for the prevention of 
downstream flooding was justified as a necessary means to save 
life and property.274 The case arose when defendants destroyed a 
levee that was blocking a natural outlet of the Sacramento 
River.275 This action flooded plaintiff’s property and destroyed 
plaintiff’s crops.276 Defendants argued that the destruction of the 
levee was necessary to prevent flooding that would wash houses 
away and endanger lives throughout the county.277 
                                               
270. See id. at 69–70 (presenting the plaintiff’s argument). 
271. See id. at 69 (“The plaintiff cannot recover for the value of the 
goods in the house which he might have saved—these are equally liable to the 
necessities of the occasion with the house in which they are placed.”). 
272. Id. at 73. 
273. 62 Cal. 575 (1881). 
274. See id. at 575–76 (“In this action, which was brought to recover 
damages for the destruction of crops, etc., caused by defendants cutting a levee 
or embankment across Wilkin's Slough, the defendants justified under an 
urgent necessity to save life and property from destruction.”). 
275. See id. (explaining the circumstances of the taking). 
276. See id. (describing the loss suffered by the plaintiff). 
277. See id. at 576–77 (Myrick, J., dissenting) (outlining the 
defendant’s argument). 





In the lower court, the judge instructed the jury that if the 
levee was constructed on the plaintiff’s property pursuant to the 
county code, “then the defendants had no right to cut the levee 
without the consent of the owners thereof, and if they did so cut 
it, their act was an unlawful act, for which they were responsible 
in damages for any injury sustained by plaintiffs.”278 This 
instruction had the effect of denying the defendants the benefit of 
the public necessity defense, and was therefore given in error.279 
The Supreme Court of California reversed the decision for further 
consideration of the defense, suggesting that if the levee was cut 
to prevent grave public injury, the defendants would not be held 
liable for damage that occurred to the plaintiff’s property.280 
Seavy v. Preble281 demonstrates the application of the 
doctrine in the context of destruction of property to prevent the 
spread of infectious disease.282 The case involved the destruction 
of wallpaper in the home of a person infected by small pox.283 The 
court found that the city physician was justified in removing the 
wallpaper in the plaintiff’s home and that he was not liable for 
damages.284 In the opinion of the court, Justice Thornton justified 
the application of the defense by explaining: 
 
Where the public health and human life are 
concerned the law requires the highest degree of 
care. It will not allow of experiments to see if a less 
degree of care will not answer. The keeper of a 
furious dog or a mad bull is not allowed to let them 
go at large to see whether they will bite or gore the 
neighbor’s children. . . . In all cases of doubt the 
                                               
278. Id. at 576. 
279. See id. (“This instruction took from the jury the defense set up, 
and in effect directed them to disregard it.”). 
280. See id. at 576 (“For this error, the judgment and order are 
reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.”). 
281. 64 Me. 120 (1874). 
282. See id. at 121 (“When the small-pox or any other contagious 
disease exists in any town or city the law demands the utmost vigilance to 
prevent its spread.”). 
283. See id. at 123 (explaining the taking at issue). 
284. See id. (“Under these circumstances we think he was justified 
in advising the removal of the paper from the walls of the rooms in which the 
small-pox patients had been confined, and that the law protected him in so 
doing.”). 
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safest course should be pursued remembering that 
it is infinitely better to do too much than run the 
risk of doing too little.285 
 
2. Mad Dog Case 
 
Although the Restatement and the cases above emphasize 
imminence as a prerequisite for application of the defense, some 
courts and commentators have suggested that “necessity” alone 
can satisfy the requirements of the doctrine.286 In illustrating this 
point, the Supreme Court of South Dakota explained: “[t]he right 
to destroy under such circumstances [of disaster] is a natural 
right which springs from the Necessity of the case.”287 Similarly, 
in Hale v. Lawrence,288 the Court of Errors and Appeals of New 
Jersey explained: “[t]he right to take or destroy private property, 
by an individual in self defen[s]e, or for the protection of life, 
liberty, or property . . . is a natural right . . . founded upon 
necessity and not expediency. It may be exercised by . . . a 
community of individuals, in defen[s]e of their common 
safety. . . .”289  
Putnam v. Payne,290 a case about a dangerous dog that 
came before the Supreme Court of New York in 1812, illustrates 
the focus on necessity rather than a strict imminence 
requirement.291 In Putnam, after public alarm regarding mad 
dogs was communicated to public officials, the town of 
Lansingburgh passed an ordinance authorizing the killing of dogs 
found unleashed and unaccompanied in the town.292 The 
plaintiff’s dog was notoriously vicious and a “mad” dog had 
                                               
285. Id. at 121–22. 
286. See Craig, supra note 251, at 420 (discussing the degree of 
necessity required to justify regulatory taking). 
289. Rapid City v. Boland, 271 N.W.2d 60, 66 (S.D. 1978) (quoting 1 
NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.43(2)). 
288. 21 N.J.L. 714 (1848). 
289. Id. at 729. 
290. 13 Johns. 312 (N.Y. 1812). 
291. See id. at 312 (“Any person is justified in killing a ferocious 
and dangerous dog, which is permitted to run at large by its owner, or escapes 
through negligent keeping, the owner having notice of its vicious disposition.”). 
292. See id. (describing the by-law passed requiring the restraint of 
dogs). 





allegedly bitten him.293 The defendant found the plaintiffs’ dog 
running alone in the street and shot him dead.294 The plaintiff 
brought suit for damages for the destruction of his property 
against the defendant.295 Despite the uncertainty regarding if or 
when the dog might attack a person, the court found for the 
defendant because of the potential risk that the loose dog posed to 
the community.296 The court held that: “Any person is justified in 
killing a ferocious and dangerous dog, which is permitted to run 
at large by its owner, or escapes through negligent keeping, the 
owner having notice of its vicious disposition. Any person is 
justified in killing a dog which has been bitten by another mad 
animal.”297  
 
3. Cases of Military Necessity 
 
As in the case of the mad dog, courts overlook the 
incompatibility between a strict imminence requirement and the 
uncertainty surrounding the occurrence of an attack, in cases of 
abeyance of a common enemy in the context of military 
operations.298 In these cases, the Court focuses on the necessity of 
using the destruction of private property as a preemptive tactic to 
avoid public harm.299 The Restatement (Second) of Torts notes 
that the privilege of the public necessity defense attaches to 
anyone who violates property rights in order to “protect against 
or repel a public enemy.”300 
                                               
293. See id. (explaining that the plaintiff knew that his dog had 
previously attacked passersby, but failed to keep him adequately contained). 
294. See id. (stating the defendant found the plaintiff’s dog 
wandering the streets while he was on a mission to kill the mad dog which had 
previously bitten the plaintiff’s dog). 
295. See id. (explaining that the lower court had found for the 
plaintiff). 
296. See id. (describing the dog as dangerous and unruly). 
297. Id. 
298. See Cohan supra note 261, at 694–718 (describing cases in 
which military necessity has prevailed over private property rights). 
299. SEE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (1965) (“A privilege 
similar to that stated in this Section has been recognized in older cases, where 
members of the military forces have acted to occupy, remove, or destroy property 
for the purpose of protection against a public enemy.”). 
300. See id. (noting when the public necessity defense attaches). 
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In United States v. Caltex,301 the Court held that the 
demolition of an oil companies’ terminal facilities in Manila for 
the purpose of preventing the enemy from using the facilities as a 
strategic stronghold from which to wage war did not constitute a 
compensable taking.302 Justice Vinson noted that the common law 
defense allows “the sovereign, with immunity, [to] destroy the 
property of a few [so] that the property of many and the lives of 
many more could be saved.”303  
The Court also addressed the application of the public 
necessity defense in the context of fending off a common enemy in 
United States v. Pacific Railroad Company.304 Here, the Court 
found that the destruction of bridges during the Civil War did not 
constitute a compensable taking where the bridges were 
destroyed by the Northern Army for the purpose of impeding the 
advancement of the Confederate Army.305 Justice Field explained 
that “destruction or injury of private property in battle, or in the 
bombardment of cities and towns . . . had to be borne by the 
sufferers alone. . . . The safety of the state in such cases overrides 
all considerations of private loss.”306  
 
B. Application to Regulatory Takings Cases Involving 
Wetlands Protection 
 
Although the public necessity defense is typically 
conceived of as a tort defense, the Court in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council endorsed the use of the doctrine as a 
defense to constitutional takings claims.307 Justice Scalia 
                                               
301.  344 U.S. 149 (1952). 
302. See id. at 156 (“[T]he court below erred in holding that 
respondents have a constitutional right to compensation on the claims presented 
to this Court.”). 
303. See id. at 154 (describing situations, such as war, when 
government taking is justified). 
304. 120 U.S. 227 (1887). 
305. See id. at 239 (“[T]he government cannot be charged for 
injuries to, or destruction of, private property caused by military operations of 
armies in the field, or measures taken for their safety and efficiency . . . .”). 
306. Id. at 234. 
307. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1029 n.16 (1992) (quoting Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18–19 (1880)) (giving 
an example of the use of public necessity as a defense to a taking); see also infra 
notes 310311. (justifying state taking of land under necessary circumstances). 





explained that confiscatory regulations can be imposed without 
compensation if the limitations that they impose on property use 
can be found in “the restrictions that background principles of the 
State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land 
ownership.”308 In footnote sixteen, Justice Scalia expounded “[t]he 
principal ‘otherwise’ that we have in mind is litigation absolving 
the State . . . of liability for the destruction of ‘real and personal 
property, in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of 
a fire’ or to forestall other grave threats to the lives and property 
of others.”309  
In outlining the application of property and nuisance 
principles to regulatory takings claims, Justice Scalia explained 
that the owner of a lakebed would not be entitled to compensation 
if he were denied a permit to engage in landfilling operations that 
would result in the flooding of neighboring lands.310 Justice Scalia 
also noted that the owner of a nuclear power plant would not be 
entitled to compensation if (s)he were required “to remove all 
improvements from [his/her] land upon discovery that the plant 
sits astride an earthquake fault.”311 Although the regulations at 
issue in these examples may have the effect of permanently 
eliminating the land’s only economically productive use, the 
owners are not entitled to compensation because the newly 
proscribed activities had always violated the background 
principles of state nuisance and property law.312  
Given the underlying principles supporting application of 
the public necessity defense and the public hazards that the 
defense is intended to remedy, the defense should be extended to 
                                               
308. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (1992) (“A law or decree with such 
an effect must, in other words, do no more than duplicate the result that could 
have been reached in the courts . . . .”).  
309. See id. at 1029 n.16 (quoting Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 
18–19 (1880)). 
310. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (providing examples of how the 
background principles of property and nuisance law apply in to regulatory 
takings claims). 
311. See id. (giving further examples of situations where 
individuals are not entitled to compensation). 
312. See id. at 1030 (“The use of these properties for what are now 
expressly prohibited purposes was always unlawful, and (subject to other 
constitutional limitations) it was open to the State at any point to make the 
implication of those background principles of nuisance and property law 
explicit.”). 
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cases of regulatory takings where the underlying exaction was 
designed to prevent coastal erosion.313 As with fires, floods, and 
infectious diseases, coastal storms present extraordinary risks to 
human health and public safety.314 The death toll in coastal 
storms is significant: Hurricane Katrina killed over 1,800 people 
and Hurricane Sandy killed 132 people. 315 While blunt force 
trauma during the storms caused many of these deaths, post-
disaster infectious diseases pose an additional threat to public 
health and safety.316 Displaced persons living in overcrowded 
shelters with poor water and sanitation conditions, poor 
nutritional status, and insufficient personal hygiene are 
susceptible to surges in infectious diseases.317  
Coastal storm damage also results in severe property and 
economic losses.318 Hurricane Katrina damaged 1.2 million 
housing units and displaced over 1 million people.319 Months after 
the storm, nearly 600,000 families remained homeless.320 
Hurricane Sandy destroyed nearly 380,000 buildings and housing 
units.321 The total economic damage caused by Hurricanes 
                                               
313. See supra notes 272, 282, 285, 303, 306 and accompanying 
text. 
314. See generally Isidore Koffi Kouadio et al., Infectious Diseases 
Following Natural Disasters: Prevention and Control Measures, 10 EXPERT REV. 
ANTI. INFECT. THER. 95, (2012), available at 
http://i.unu.edu/media/unu.edu/publication/20293/koffis-publication-2012.pdf 
(describing health and safety concerns in the aftermath of natural disasters) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
315. See Newman, supra note 3 (comparing the impacts of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy). 
316. See Kouadio supra note 314, at 97–99 (explaining causes of 
death and infectious disease during and after natural disasters). 
317. See id. at 96–97. (describing the challenges faced by persons 
displaced after natural disasters). 
318. See Newman supra note 3 (comparing damage statistics for 
Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy). 
319. See id. at 1 (estimating housing damage caused by Hurricane 
Katrina). 
320. See id. at 2 (estimating displacement from Hurricane Katrina). 
321. See id. (explaining that 305,000 housing units were damaged 
or destroyed in New York, 72,000 were damaged in New Jersey, and 3,000 were 
damaged in Connecticut). 





Katrina and Sandy was estimated to be $148 billion and $80 
billion, respectively.322  
Not only are these astronomical costs to life, health, and 
property analogous to cases of fire, flood, and infectious disease, 
they are also analogous to the dangers associated with military 
action in defense against a common enemy.323 In fact, the public 
enemy doctrine, another water-related legal defense, recognizes 
that extraordinary water conditions created by the ocean, 
unexpected or unprecedented floods, and storm water runoff 
constitute public enemies against which measures can be taken 
in derogation of traditional property rights.324 The Florida 
Supreme Court reiterated this point in Paty v. Town of Palm 
Beach,325 noting that “[t]he waters of the sea are usually 
considered a common enemy.”326 Given the similarity in damage 
to life and property caused by military combat and that caused by 
flooding and storm surge, there is no logical reason why the 
defense should be used to protect against one enemy and not 
another.327 
The largest hurdle for coastal protection cases to overcome 
in the application of the public necessity defense is the 
imminence requirement.328 Critics explain that the slow process 
of wetlands erosion and the uncertainty of coastal storms cannot 
                                               
322. See id. (comparing estimated costs of total damage for 
Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy). 
323. See America’s Wars Fact Sheet, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 
(May 2013), http://www.va.gov/opa/publications/factsheets/fs_americas_wars.pdf 
(offering an overview of dead and wounded statistics for America’s wars) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
324. See Jones v. California Dev. Co., 173 Cal. 565, 574 (1916) (“The 
underlying principle governing the decision of all these cases . . . is that in such 
stress the landowner may use every reasonable precaution to avert injury from 
his land, and . . . will not be held liable for consequent damage which by these 
reasonable acts may be inflicted upon another landowner.”). 
325. 158 Fla. 575 (1947). 
326. Id. at 576. 
327. See supra notes 315–322 and accompanying text (describing 
the damage caused by coastal storms). 
328. See Craig, supra note 251, at 421–22 (describing the 
arguments against applicability of the Public necessity defense in the context of 
coastal protection).  
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satisfy a strict legal requirement of imminence.329 However, 
uncertainty as to when and where coastal storms will fall should 
not hinder application of the defense, as this uncertainty was 
present in Seavy v. Preble, Putnam v. Payne, United States v. 
Caltex, and United States v. Pacific R. Co.330 These cases 
illustrate that the public necessity defense can be used 
preemptively to prevent severe harm where it is likely that harm 
will occur.331  
In Putnam v. Payne, the state could not predict with 
absolute certainty when or where the dog might attack a person, 
but the court relied upon past experience with mad dogs to justify 
the killing of the dog at issue in the case.332 In United States v. 
Caltex and United States v. Pacific R. Co. the federal government 
could not predict with absolute certainty when or where enemy 
attacks would occur, but the court relied upon military 
intelligence and experience to justify the derogation of private 
property rights.333  
In Seavy v. Preble, the doctor could not predict with 
absolute certainty if the infected wallpaper would cause the small 
pox to spread to other individuals in the community, but the 
court relied upon expert testimony regarding usual practice to 
justify the removal of the wallpaper.334 Significantly, Seavy also 
demonstrated that scientific certainty and professional unanimity 
of opinion are not required for application of the defense.335 The 
court found the removal of the wallpaper was justified despite 
                                               
329. See id. at 420 (explaining how a requirement of imminence 
could limit the applicability of a public necessity defense). 
330. See supra notes 281–306 and accompanying text. 
331. See supra notes 302–307 and accompanying text. 
332.  See Putnam v. Payne, 13 Johns. 312, (N.Y. 1816) (stating that 
public safety demands people be able to shoot mad dogs). 
333. See United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 154–56 (1952) 
(applying the principles set out in United States v. Pacific R. Co. to hold that 
there was not a taking); United States v. Pacific R. Co., 120 U.S. 227, 239 (1887) 
(establishing a takings exception for private property destroyed during war). 
334. See Seavy v. Preble, 64 Me. 120, 122 (1874) (evaluating expert 
testimony). 
335. See id. at 123 (“Unfortunately medical science has not yet 
arrived at that degree of perfection which will enable its practitioners to agree. 
There is scarcely a case tried where medical testimony is used, in which the 
doctors do not disagree.”). 





conflicting expert testimony regarding the efficacy of the action in 
preventing the spread of infectious diseases.336 
As in these cases, although the state cannot predict with 
absolute certainty when or where a coastal storm will occur, 
scientific evidence can be used to forecast coastal storm damage 
to a significant degree of certainty.337 Technological 
advancements now allow for the forecasting of coastal storms, 
such that experts can roughly predict where coastal storms will 
likely fall and what their potential damage will be.338 The above 
mentioned U.S. Geological Survey study, which compared 
predicted elevations of hurricane-induced water levels to coastal 
topography along the Southeast Atlantic Coast, resulted in a 
determination that “[t]he combination of large waves and surges 
in a region with low coastal elevations makes the entire 
southeast Atlantic vulnerable to significant coastal erosion 
during storms.”339 Therefore, states along the South Atlantic 
Coast should be able to defend land use restrictions where they 
can identify a need to protect vulnerable communities from the 




A healthy and robust network of wetlands protects coastal 
communities from storm damage.341 Federal and state law 
makers enacted regulatory regimes that combat wetland 
degradation.342 However, these regimes are difficult for private 
property owners to navigate, lack inter-governmental 
coordination, give rise to conflicts between private property rights 
                                               
336. See id. (“He could not go to his medical brethren for direction 
for they . . . were divided in opinion. . . . Under these circumstances we think he 
was justified in advising the removal of the paper from the walls of the rooms in 
which the small-pox patients had been confined . . . .”). 
337. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
338. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.  
339. STOCKDON, ET AL., supra note 53, at 24. 
340. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
341. See supra Part II (describing the benefits of coastal wetlands). 
342. See supra Parts IV–IIV (outlining the current legislative and 
regulatory regimes). 
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and public welfare, and are threatened by the regulatory chilling 
effect that may arise post-Koontz.343 
The communities most vulnerable to the long-term, 
negative impacts of coastal hurricanes and storm surge are those 
with the least amount of resources at their disposal.344 The 
citizens of these communities rely upon the state to protect their 
interests during permitting and litigation processes.345 In order to 
protect these communities from the harm caused by forestalling 
coastal protections, courts should expand the public necessity 
defense to regulatory takings cases.346 By absolving the state of 
liability in situations where the destruction of coastal wetlands 
will expose vulnerable communities to harm from hurricanes and 
rising sea levels, the public necessity defense will effectively 
balance the private and public interests at stake.347 
                                               
343. See supra Parts IV–VI (describing the challenges presented by 
the current legislative and regulatory regimes). 
344. See supra Part III (describing the environmental justice 
implications of coastal wetland degradation).  
345. See supra Part III (explaining that the members of 
environmental justice communities are under-represented in bureaucratic 
systems). 
346. See supra Part VII (arguing for the expansion of the public 
necessity defense). 
347. See supra Part VIII.B (analogizing the harm caused in 
traditional public necessity cases to the harm caused by coastal storms). 
